Will the New Jersey Special Senate Election Survive Judicial Review?

Update: the answer to this question is apparently yes, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to hear the challenge.

A three-judge panel of the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division has issued this opinion rejecting a legal challenge to Governor Christie’s writ of election setting an October 16, 2013 date for the special election to fill the Senate seat that became vacant as the result of Senator Lautenberg’s death. The case, however, has been set for a fast track review by the New Jersey Supreme Court (hat tip: Rick Hasen), with briefs challenging the writ to be filed on Monday, June 17, and the Governor’s response due on Tuesday, June 18.

The appellate division opinion does not do a whole lot to clarify the meaning of the relevant New Jersey law, IMHO, but it does raise what appears to be another significant legal and practical problem with holding two elections in such a short period.

The court begins its analysis with the proposition that “[b]ecause Senator Lautenberg died on the day prior to the primary election, N.J.S.A. 19:27-6 governs.” Under this provision, the vacancy would be filled at the “second succeeding election” (i.e., in November 2014) unless the Governor calls a special election. The court states that “[w]ithout question, the Governor was authorized to call a special election in this circumstance, where the vacancy occurred one day prior to the primary.”

But what about N.J.S.A. 19:3-26, which appears to require that the vacancy be filled at the next general election (i.e., in November 2013) unless the vacancy occurred less than 70 days before that general election (which it did not)? The court does not attempt to reconcile this provision with 27-6 nor to explain how one would resolve the conflict between the two provisions if the Governor did not call a special election. It does state at one point that “[w]ithout a special election, this seat would be filled by an appointee for the remainder of the term.” That suggests that 27-6 would control (although, even then, the appointee would only serve until November 2014, not until the expiration of the term in January 2015). But the court offers no explanation as to why that would be the case.

The court also rejects the plaintiffs’ argument that 3-26 precludes the Governor from calling a special election. It evinces some sympathy for the Governor’s position that 3-26 permits the calling of a special election under any circumstances, not merely where the vacancy occurs less than 70 days before the general election. The Governor relied on the punctuation in 3-26, which (you may recall) provides:

If a vacancy shall happen in the representation of this State in the United States senate, it shall be filled at the general election next succeeding the happening thereof, unless such vacancy shall happen within 70 days next preceding such election, in which case it shall be filled by election at the second succeeding general election, unless the governor of this State shall deem it advisable to call a special election therefor, which he is authorized hereby to do.

According to the Governor, “the comma preceding the authorizing clause” (i.e., the comma immediately preceding the second “unless”) demonstrates “the Legislature’s intention to authorize a special election whether the vacancy occurs fewer or more than seventy days before the general election.” Maybe this is right, although it seems to me that the Legislature would have more clearly expressed this intention if it had used the word “or” instead of the comma, but I suppose this might have created an ambiguity as to which “unless” clause governs if both apply.

In any event, the court did not seem to be completely convinced by the Governor’s argument because it stressed that it was limiting its holding to the situation in which the Governor was already authorized to call a special election under 27-6: “In this circumstance, it would be wholly absurd to conclude that the Legislature intended to authorize a special election in N.J.S.A. 19:27-6 and preclude it in N.J.S.A. 19:3-26, even if the punctuation the Legislature chose did not support a contrary reading, as the punctuation used plainly does.” In other words, if Lautenberg had died the day after the primary election, instead of the day before, the court is not deciding whether Christie would have had the authority to call a special election under 3-26, although it seems to be leaning toward the conclusion that he would.

As for the timing of the special election, the court held that this was a matter within the Governor’s discretion. Although 27-6 tightly constricts the Governor’s discretion as to dates for the special primary and special elections once he issues the writ, there is no specific time set for issuing the writ. According to the court, the Legislature therefore must have intended the Governor to have a wide discretion in selecting the date of the special election:

Without question, the Legislature has authorized the Governor to select the date of the special elections, which can be accomplished by assigning the statutory dates backward from the date for a special general election that the Governor deems advisable before issuing the writ.  The Legislature could have, but did not, limit that discretion, and its breadth must have been as obvious to the Legislature at the time it was written as it is now. Because of the date of Senator Lautenberg’s death, this special election could have been scheduled for the same date as the general election.

The court seems to be saying that the Governor can indefinitely delay the issuance of the writ of election in order to set whatever date he wants for the special election. This seems to me to be a less than obvious conclusion. An equally if not more plausible inference from the legislature’s failure to specify a date for issuing the writ is that the legislature intended that it be issued either forthwith or within a reasonable time of the occurrence of the vacancy. In this case that might have allowed the Governor to set the special election on the same date as the general election. But the court’s assumption that the legislature intended for the Governor to have a broad discretion in choosing when to issue the writ seems to be in some tension with the very limited discretion it gave him once the writ issues.

Finally, the court declined to second guess the Governor’s decision to hold the special election on October 16, rather than on the date of this year’s general election, November 5. The issue of the cost of holding a separate election was a policy issue, the court sensibly concluded, that was not for judges to decide. However, the court did express a serious concern with the logistical difficulties involved in using the same voting machines in two statewide elections in such close proximity. It noted that the machines by law must be impounded for a 15 day period after the October 16 election, which would seem to make it extremely difficult to have them ready in time for their use in the November 5 general election. Although the court did not believe that the evidence provided by the plaintiffs warranted invalidating the writ, it left open the possibility of future challenges on this ground:

We view the potential for problems it may create in conducting the general election at this point as a matter committed to the Governor and relevant to his determination as to whether the date of this special election, dictated by his writ, is “advisable.” In our view, there is no question of statutory or constitutional violation that is ripe, and, as the State’s Chief Executive Officer, the Governor’s policy decision and assessment of the feasibility of accomplishing it is not reviewable.

(emphasis added).

This issue strikes me as raising a greater danger, both legal and practical, to the viability of Christie’s action than the attack on his authority to call a special election in the first place. But I guess we will see what the New Jersey Supreme Court thinks.

“We are pleased that the jury acquitted Mr. Renzi on 15 counts”

Former Congressman Rick Renzi’s attorney, who is responsible for the quote above, is obviously a glass-half-full type of person. As it happens, Renzi was also convicted on the other 17 of the 32 counts against him (so the glass was not quite half full). You can read the verdict form here.

The linked Washington Post story indicates that Renzi intends to appeal. I am sure that there will be Speech or Debate issues presented on appeal, although some of Renzi’s potential arguments may be foreclosed or made more difficult by the prior Ninth Circuit ruling in his case. It should also be noted that some of the counts on which he was convicted (e.g., Counts 28-30) involve insurance fraud/false statements that appear to be unrelated to his legislative activities or official duties. Therefore, Renzi will not be able to argue for a complete reversal of the verdict based on Speech or Debate alone.

An Unwarranted Attack on the House and the Ethics Committee

In an oddly speaking complaint, Representative Charlie Rangel, represented by New York attorney Jay Goldberg, has filed suit in federal court against the Speaker, the Clerk and several former members and staff of the House Ethics Committee, including Zoe Lofgren, the former Democratic chair, and Jo Bonner, the former Republican ranking member. Cutting through the ample legal verbiage, Rangel’s complaint comes down to this: the court should set aside his December 2, 2010 censure by the House of Representatives because that discipline stemmed from a recommendation by the Ethics Committee that was tainted by “numerous flagrant, knowing and intentional violations of Plaintiff’s Due Process rights and his other fundamental constitutional rights.”

If a court could consider these claims, Rangel’s chances of prevailing on them would be extremely remote. They appear to be based entirely on internal memoranda written by Blake Chisam, then the staff director and chief counsel of the Ethics Committee, about alleged misconduct of two subordinate lawyers, Morgan Kim and Stacy Sovereign, who worked on both the Maxine Waters and Rangel cases. Rangel’s complaint attaches these memoranda (which we have discussed before) and describes them as “essential reading.” Complaint at ¶ 38.

The Ethics Committee previously retained Outside Counsel Billy Martin to investigate these precise allegations in the context of the Waters case. Martin conducted an extensive investigation, at substantial taxpayer expense, and reported to the Committee in September 2012 that there was no due process violation in the Waters matter. Although the report does not analyze the allegations with respect to the Rangel case, its reasoning strongly suggests the same result would obtain there.

Following the issuance of the Outside Counsel report, the Committee wrote to Rangel, rejecting his request to re-open his case. The letter begins by observing “[w]e have received and considered the numerous communications from your counsel, Mr. Jay Goldberg” (emphasis added).  It then states “it is the unanimous opinion of the Committee the there is no legal or factual basis supporting a conclusion that you have been deprived of any constitutional rights in your proceedings.” It emphasizes that this opinion was based on the analysis of its current non-partisan staff (which was not involved in the original Rangel matter) and was consistent with the analysis of Outside Counsel in the Waters case. It concludes with the suggestion that Rangel and his attorney not make “any further public comments” that are “misleading” or “inconsistent with the facts or law in this matter.” The Committee’s irritation with Rangel and Goldberg is barely disguised.

Continue reading “An Unwarranted Attack on the House and the Ethics Committee”

Dueling Speech or Debate Privileges in the Renzi Case

National Journal had an article last week regarding the Speech or Debate waiver issue in the Renzi case (hat tip: Rick Hasen), which we discussed awhile back.

Another interesting Speech or Debate issue is raised in this motion by the House General Counsel on behalf of Kevin Messner, a non-party witness. Messner served at different times as a staffer for then-Congressman Renzi and for Jim Kolbe, another (now former) congressman from Arizona. Messner has potentially relevant knowledge from his service for both of the former members. This is because both Renzi and Kolbe were interested and involved in the land exchange legislation that is at the heart of the charges against Renzi, and Messner worked on the legislation in the course of his service for each of them.

Both the prosecution and the defense expressed an interest in questioning Messner about his knowledge and activities regarding the land exchange legislation. The House Counsel, however, sought and obtained a protective order barring the parties “from questioning Kevin Messner at trial concerning the legislative activities of former U.S. Representative James Kolbe.”

Because Kolbe declined to waive his Speech or Debate privilege, he was entitled to object to questioning of Messner with respect to certain matters. I am not sure, though, that it is quite right to say that Kolbe has the right to object to any questioning of Messner regarding Kolbe’s legislative activities. Messner may have knowledge of Kolbe’s legislative activities during the time that Messner worked for Renzi. I don’t think Kolbe would have the right to object to Messner’s testifying about that.

Kolbe’s right to assert Speech or Debate cannot be based solely on the fact that Messner is being questioned about Kolbe’s legislative activities. If Messner had worked only for Renzi, Kolbe would have had no privilege to assert.  Kolbe’s right to assert privilege derives from the fact that the law views Messner as Kolbe’s “alter ego” with regard to the period when Messner worked for him. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972). Thus, Kolbe may assert the privilege when Messner is questioned about matters within the “legislative sphere” only if they occurred during Messner’s service in Kolbe’s office (because the law deems this the equivalent of questioning Kolbe himself).

Renzi is in a different position. He can object to questioning Messner regarding his service in Renzi’s office on the same alter ego theory, but, as the defendant, he can also object to introduction of evidence regarding legislative acts regardless of the source. Thus, Renzi could object to Messner’s testimony about Renzi’s legislative acts even if that testimony related solely to Messner’s service as a Kolbe staffer. I think (although I am not sure this has ever been litigated) Renzi could even object to Messner’s testimony if it related solely to Kolbe’s legislative acts, and arose solely from Messner’s work for Kolbe.

If this is correct, there should be no question Messner could be asked to which Kolbe alone would have the right to object. However, as House Counsel points out, Kolbe has an independent right to assert the Speech or Debate privilege, including to questions that Renzi might want to ask of Messner.

To protect Kolbe’s privilege, House Counsel not only obtained a protective order, but secured permission from the judge to sit in the well of the court during Messner’s testimony and raise any Speech or Debate objections on a question-by-question basis. This is a fairly novel procedure that, in my experience, many judges would be loath to permit. Theoretically, if the House Counsel objected to a question which the judge did not believe was covered by the privilege, House Counsel (on behalf of Kolbe) could take an immediate appeal from the judge’s ruling, potentially causing a delay in the trial.

I suspect that House Counsel would take such a step only in extraordinary circumstances. For one thing, it would make it less likely that judges would be willing to allow this procedure in the future.

New Jersey’s Vacant Expression

Note to self- do not make casual observations about state statutes you know nothing about. Because it turns out that the New Jersey election law I cited in my last post is only one of two (or, who knows, maybe more) provisions that the New Jersey legislature, in its wisdom, has seen fit to enact on the subject of filling vacancies in the office of U.S. Senator. The section I cited (section 3-26) appeared to require that a vacancy be filled at the next general election unless the vacancy happened within the 70 days before that general election, in which case it would be filled at the second succeeding general election. However, another section states:

Congressional vacancies.

19:27-6.  In the case of a vacancy in the representation of this State in the United States Senate or House of Representatives, the writ may designate the next general election day for the election, but if a special day is designated, it shall specify the cause and purpose of such election, the name of the officer in whose office the vacancy has occurred, the day on which a special primary election shall be held, which shall be not less than 70 days nor more than 76 days following the date of such proclamation, and the day on which the special election shall be held, which shall be not less than 64 nor more than 70 days following the day of the special primary election.  The writ shall also specify the day or days when the district boards shall meet for the purpose of making, revising or correcting the registers of voters to be used at such special election.

If the vacancy happens in the representation of this State in the United States Senate the election shall take place at the general election next succeeding the happening thereof, unless the vacancy shall happen within 70 days next preceding the primary election prior to the general election, in which case it shall be filled by election at the second succeeding election, unless the Governor shall deem it advisable to call a special election therefor, which he is authorized hereby to do.

Continue reading “New Jersey’s Vacant Expression”

Frank Lautenberg, RIP

Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, the last World War II veteran serving in the Senate, passed away today at the age of 89.

New Jersey law provides:

19:3-26. Vacancies in United States senate; election to fill; temporary appointment by governor.

19:3-26. If a vacancy shall happen in the representation of this State in the United States senate, it shall be filled at the general election next succeeding the happening thereof, unless such vacancy shall happen within 70 days next preceding such election, in which case it shall be filled by election at the second succeeding general election, unless the governor of this State shall deem it advisable to call a special election therefor, which he is authorized hereby to do.

The governor of this State may make a temporary appointment of a senator of the United States from this State whenever a vacancy shall occur by reason of any cause other than the expiration of the term; and such appointee shall serve as such senator until a special election or general election shall have been held pursuant to law and the Board of State Canvassers can deliver to his successor a certificate of election.

Note that if Attorney General Wirt’s definition of “happen” were to be applied to this statute, a vacancy would continue to “happen” until it was filled. In that case Governor Christie could wait until October to fill the vacancy, and the election to fill the remaining portion of Senator Lautenberg’s term (which ends in January 2015) could be delayed until November 2014.

However, it seems clear that “the happening” of the vacancy, at least within the meaning of the New Jersey law, refers to the specific date on which the vacancy occurs, rather than any date during which it continues to exist. Therefore, the election to fill the vacancy must occur at “the general election next succeeding” the occurrence of the vacancy, which will be in November 2013 (when New Jersey will be holding statewide elections).

This Hill article suggests that the Governor can choose to set a special election date to fill the seat. As I read the statute, he would only have that option if the vacancy happened within 70 days prior to the next general election. Therefore, I believe that the election must take place this November. But I could be wrong.

 

The Third Circuit and the “Session” of the 18th Century Vermont General Assembly

As mentioned in my prior post, in the course of analyzing the meaning of “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause, the Third Circuit considered legislative practice at the time of the framing. In looking at the state legislatures prior to 1787, the court found what it viewed as conflicting evidence on whether recesses are limited to intersession breaks.

Some state constitutions, the court noted, clearly indicated that a “recess” and a “session” cannot occur conterminously, thus supporting the intersession recess theory. For example, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions contain provisions that “make sense only if the legislature is not in ‘session’ when it is ‘in recess.'” Opinion at 48. (This is a point I previously made with respect to the Massachusetts constitution).

On the other hand, the court pointed to instances where the executive branch of a state had (allegedly) interpreted the “recess” to include intra-session breaks. For example, the Vermont constitution granted the executive power to lay embargoes during “the recess of the legislature only.” The Vermont General Assembly, which was meeting in Windsor, adjourned on April 16, 1781, stating that it would next meet on the second Wednesday of June at Bennington. During this adjournment, in May 1781, the Governor of Vermont imposed an embargo.

Continue reading “The Third Circuit and the “Session” of the 18th Century Vermont General Assembly”

The Third Circuit’s Recess Appointments Decision

Another appellate court has weighed in on the legality of President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board. In NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehabilitation, the Third Circuit held that “the Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause refers only to the period between Senate sessions. Because the NLRB appointments were made during so-called “intra-session recesses,” the court concluded that they were illegal.

Although the Third Circuit reached the same result as did the D.C. Circuit in Noel Canning, the two opinions differ in some important respects. For example, while the D.C. Circuit placed a good deal of emphasis on the RAC’s use of the word “the” (as in “the Recess”), the Third Circuit declined to do so, finding the use of that word to be “uninformative.” Opinion at 57. The Third Circuit also declined to reach the issue of whether a vacancy must occur during a recess to be filled under the RAC. Opinion at 101 n.34.

The Third Circuit begins its analysis by identifying three possible meanings of “the Recess of the Senate”; (1) intersession breaks; (2) intersession breaks plus those intra-session breaks that last a non-negligible period (which the executive branch has historically identified, based on the Daugherty opinion, as more than ten days); and (3) “any time in which the Senate is not open for business and is unavailable to provide its advice and consent.” Opinion at 38. The last definition is, according to the court, the definition proffered by the NLRB.

The opinion looks at dictionary definitions (specifically Johnson’s dictionary) and legislative practice at the time of the framing, historical practice of the President and Congress under the RAC and other considerations, such as the need to adopt a definition of “recess” that provides a bright-line test that the political branches can rely upon. It finds some of these inconclusive, but most of them tend to cut against the second and/or third options, leaving the first (intersession breaks) as the most plausible meaning of the the “recess.” As John Elwood observes at the Volokh Conspiracy, the court places particular emphasis on the fact that recess appointments expire at the end of the “next Session.” It reasons that this durational provision must have been designed to ensure that recess appointments remain as an “auxiliary” method of appointment so that recess appointees serve “for only the time needed for the president and the Senate to have the opportunity to undergo the normal process.” Opinion at 75. If recess appointments could be made during intra-session breaks, then the Senate’s reconvening to continue the same session would have no effect on the recess appointment, which would continue even though the Senate was available to confirm a permanent appointment.. Opinion at 78.

In a rather rambling dissent, Judge Greenaway concludes that the “recess” must include both intersession and intra-session breaks. Adopting a functional approach, he argues that the purpose of the RAC is to allow the President to fill positions when the Senate is unavailable to provide advice and consent. Because the Senate is equally unavailable to provide advice and consent whether it is on an intersession or intra-session break, Judge Greenaway finds that the RAC must apply to both. Dissent at 6.

Although there is much to be commended in the majority opinion, it rests on a misconception (or at least an unexamined assumption) regarding the nature of a “session.” To which I will turn in my next post.

Lois Lerner and Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege

Everybody is talking about whether Lois Lerner waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by making an exculpatory opening statement at yesterday’s hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (eg, these posts at Hot Air and the Volokh Conspiracy). As Juliet Eilperin notes, “[l]ike a lot of legal questions, it depends on whom you ask.”

It also depends on how you approach the question. Chairman Issa has indicated that he is consulting with counsel, and counsel (presumably the House Counsel’s office) will give him an answer based on reading the case law and advising on how the courts would likely react to the waiver issue if the committee and the House were to hold Lerner in contempt for refusing to answer questions. As I mentioned yesterday, this issue arose when I was at the House Counsel’s office in 2002 after Bernie Ebbers, the former CEO of WorldCom, made an exculpatory opening statement before taking the Fifth at a House hearing.

At the time, Ebbers’ lawyer (Reid Weingarten) argued that there was no waiver because Ebbers had made an exculpatory statement, but had not testified to any incriminating fact. He relied on cases where witnesses in judicial proceedings had been held not to waive the privilege when they answered questions but had not provided an incriminating response. There is, however, a strong argument that these cases are distinguishable because they involve witnesses who were compelled to answer questions and had no right to refuse to answer unless their responses would in fact incriminate them. They might apply to a congressional witness who answered preliminary questions before taking the Fifth, but they arguably do not apply to a congressional witness who voluntarily makes an opening statement. The latter situation (again, arguably) would be controlled by the principle that “a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999).

For present purposes, let’s assume that the House Counsel advises Issa that it is likely (not certain) that the courts would hold that Lerner had waived her self-incrimination privilege under the facts presented. Let’s further assume that the law has not changed materially since 2002. Finally, let’s assume that there have been at least a few other congressional witnesses since then who have pulled similar stunts, but the House has not previously held any of them in contempt.

Under these circumstances, COGR could move forward with holding Lerner in contempt, but I would argue that it would be unwise to do so from the perspective of the House’s institutional interest. Instead, I would encourage the committee to declare prospectively that witnesses who make voluntary opening statements will be presumptively considered to have waived their privilege against self-incrimination with respect to questions within the subject matter of those statements (i.e., questions that would be within the scope of cross examination of an opening statement).

It is undoubtedly in the House’s institutional interest to discourage witnesses from making a self-serving opening statement and then refusing to answer a committee’s questions about it. On the other hand, it is also in the House’s institutional interest to turn square corners and maximize the chances that its legal position will be upheld in court. If COGR holds Lerner in contempt for the same conduct that Ebbers and other congressional witnesses have been allowed to get away with, its action will be tainted by the perception of unfairness and selective enforcement, and a court will be more likely to find that no waiver occurred. By contrast, if the committee puts witnesses clearly on notice that voluntary opening statements will be deemed to waive the privilege, any future enforcement action is far more likely to be successful.

Consistent with this position, Chairman Issa and Ranking Member Elijah Cummings could write to Lerner’s attorney and give him an opportunity to formally withdraw her opening statement. If he refuses to do so, it would be appropriate for the committee to move forward with contempt.

Taking the Fifth Before Congress

In a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform yesterday, Lois Lerner’s attorney (veteran DC lawyer William Taylor) informed the committee of her intention to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights at today’s committee hearing. Taylor said that she should not be required to appear at the hearing because to do so would serve “no purpose other than to embarrass or burden her.” COGR required Lerner to appear, but dismissed her after she refused to answer questions, though not before she made an exculpatory  statement in which she denied any wrongdoing.

This raises a number of legal questions, which we will proceed to consider.

1. Why can a witness invoke the Fifth Amendment before Congress when the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to criminal cases? With surprisingly little controversy (but see here for an academic view to the contrary), it has long been accepted by Congress and the courts that a congressional witness may invoke the Fifth. The theory is that if a witness were forced to testify in a congressional hearing, that testimony could be used against her in a subsequent criminal case. Note that this theory only holds if in fact the testimony could be used in court.

2. When can the witness invoke the Fifth? The witness must have a reasonable belief that her testimony might be used against her in a criminal prosecution. This does not mean that the witness must believe that she has actually committed a crime or that her truthful testimony would lead to her conviction. It just means that there is some realistic possibility that the witness may be criminally prosecuted for a matter to which her testimony might be relevant. This is a fairly low bar.

3. Can government officials invoke the Fifth before Congress and keep their jobs? Although I personally find it difficult to understand how a government official (particularly a senior official like Lerner) can refuse to testify before Congress, which is constitutionally responsible for overseeing the activities of her agency, it is fairly clear that she cannot be fired for doing so. My view is that at the least the President should be able to fire cabinet officials and others who serve at his pleasure for invoking the Fifth, but even this view was controversial when the issue arose during my tenure on the Hill. In any event, Lerner is a career employee, and my understanding is that she cannot be subjected to adverse employment consequences (unlike a private employee) for invoking her self-incrimination privilege.

4. Does Lerner have a colorable basis for invoking the Fifth? Yes. As mentioned earlier, there is a fairly low bar. The Justice Department has commenced a criminal investigation of the matter, and Lerner has reason to believe that she could be the target of investigation and ultimately of prosecution. In particular, it is conceivable that she could be prosecuted for making false or misleading statements to Congress. For example, this letter that she received from Chairman Darrell Issa and Representative Jim Jordan on May 14, 2013 points to various discrepancies between the facts as Lerner knew them and various statements that she made to Congress.

5. Can Congress require a witness to appear at a public hearing to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights? The short answer to this is yes. However, as we have discussed before (see here and here), the D.C. Bar has opined that a committee staff lawyer may violate the legal ethics rules if he or she participates in calling a witness to appear at a public hearing when the witness has asserted an intent to invoke the Fifth. By claiming that there was no legitimate purpose in requiring his client to appear, Taylor probably intended to suggest that committee lawyers participating in the hearing could run afoul of this legal ethics opinion. Perhaps this is why the committee was willing to excuse Lerner so quickly.

6. Does a witness waive her Fifth Amendment privilege when she voluntarily makes an exculpatory statement at a congressional hearing? You would think so, and apparently Representative Trey Gowdy made just that argument after Lerner made her statement. Unfortunately, witnesses at congressional hearings have been getting away with this for years. For example, when Bernie Ebbers, prior to taking the Fifth at a July 8, 2002 hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services, made an opening statement in which he denied all wrongdoing, a number of members argued that this statement waived the self-incrimination privilege. His lawyer (Reid Weingarten), however, argued that a “brief, non-incriminatory statement” did not waive the privilege. This was (and, as far as I know, still is) a debatable position, but the House has not seen fit to challenge it up to this point.

7. Can Congress require Lerner to testify notwithstanding her invocation of privilege? Yes. Recall that the privilege only prevents testimony that can be used in a criminal trial. By statute (see 18 U.S.C. 6002, 6005), a congressional committee may grant a witness immunity so that her statements may not be used against her; once such immunity is granted, the witness can be compelled before the committee. Initiating the process requires a two-thirds vote of the committee. Although in theory the witness receives only “use immunity” (meaning that she can still be prosecuted so long as her compelled statements are not used), the case law (in the D.C. Circuit at least) makes prosecution nearly impossible.

8. Would Lerner be a good candidate for immunity? Maybe. In part that depends on how likely one thinks it is that she would be prosecuted if immunity is not granted. Based on what is known today, by far the most likely criminal charge against her would relate to misleading Congress. But it would be difficult to prosecute her unless one can point to an unambiguous false statement and prove that she knew it was false when she made it. Even if a case could theoretically be made, one has to consider how likely it would be that the Department of Justice would prosecute her for misleading Congress, particularly on a theory that could ensnare many other senior administration officials.