Truman, Wolkinson, and the Invention of Executive Privilege

Apropos of nothing, I was reading Judge MacKinnon’s dissent in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) and came across a passage I had not paid attention to before. In arguing that historical practice “firmly establish[es] a custom and usage that a President need not produce information which he considers would be contrary to the public interest,” id. at 737, MacKinnon cites the following episode from the Truman administration:

In 1948, following an abortive attempt by a Republican-controlled Congress to obtain certain information and papers from the executive department, a bill was prepared which, if enacted, would have required every President to produce confidential information even though he considered that compliance would be contrary to the public interest. President Truman thought that such a law would be unconstitutional and in preparation for the 1948 presidential election campaign he had a lengthy memorandum prepared (hereinafter referred to as the “Truman Memorandum”). The Truman Memorandum recites all the principal instances, beginning in 1796, where Presidents have refused to furnish information or papers to Congress.

Id. at 731.

MacKinnon cites a 1948 New York Times article which discusses this memorandum. The article, written in the midst of the Truman-Dewey presidential campaign, explains that “President Truman’s legal advisers have prepared for his use in the campaign a book-length memorandum designed to prove his right to refuse to deliver any papers or information held by him or his Cabinet officers to the Congress or its committees.”  The article notes that the memorandum relates most immediately to controversies regarding Truman’s refusal to provide information regarding federal employee “disloyalty files” to congressional committees, but that it also may be seen in the light of “much larger issues”

The article does not identify the “legal advisers” who drafted the memorandum. It does, however, cite “[o]ne of the authors of the memorandum [who] compared the relationship of the President and Congress under the Constitution to that of husband and wife, in a marriage where laws cannot compel one to acquiesce to the other.” In this somewhat odd analogy the “ultimate disposition of a quarrel between them” could only be by a political “divorce” in the form of impeachment proceedings against the president.

After conferring with Professors Josh Chafetz and Jonathan Shaub, I concluded that the memorandum in question was likely an early version of the famous memorandum prepared by Herman Wolkinson, the obscure and mysterious Justice Department official whose work would later become the basis for the Eisenhower administration’s creation of the doctrine of executive privilege. Wolkinson first published his study in 1949 as a three-part series of articles in the Federal Bar Journal, but to my knowledge this 1948 version had not been made publicly available.

Judge MacKinnon clearly had a copy (perhaps from his days at the Eisenhower Department of Justice), and he indicated that the original was kept at the Truman Library. So I reached out to the very helpful staff at the Truman Library and they found for me the 102 page memorandum described in New York Times article.

As suspected, this is a version of the Wolkinson memorandum. In fact, as far as I can tell, it is identical, except for a few changes in formatting, spacing, punctuation, etc., to the version that then-Deputy Attorney General William Rogers submitted to a Senate Judiciary subcommittee on April 10, 1957. See Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government, Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d sess. 62 (1958).

Rogers described the memorandum as “a study prepared in this Department” and that is how I always understood the Wolkinson memorandum. I assumed that Wolkinson had been charged, as a DOJ employee, with researching the issue of executive privilege to assist the Department in responding to congressional demands for information during the Truman administration and that his work was re-discovered when President Eisenhower asked his attorney general for legal authority to justify resisting Senator McCarthy’s demands for information from the Army and other parts of the executive branch.

If in fact the memorandum was prepared for use in the Truman campaign of 1948, that raises some questions. How did Wolkinson become a “legal adviser” to the Truman campaign? Was he the sole author or were there others? Was he the source of the odd marriage analogy provided to the Times reporter?  Why would it be appropriate for a career Justice Department lawyer to be providing legal assistance to the president’s campaign team? (I guess if the president’s “exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials,” as asserted by the Supreme Court in Trump v. United States, covers the attempted use of the Justice Department to overturn an election the president lost, he can also use it to try to win the election in the first place.)

Anyway, this all may be of little interest to anyone who isn’t an executive privilege scholar (and perhaps not even to those who are). But given the importance of the Wolkinson memo and how little seems to be known about it, I thought it worth flagging.

Congressional Oversight, Senate Confirmation, and the Recess Appointments Gambit

On a Lawfare Podcast this week, I spoke with Molly Reynolds of the Brookings Institution and Donald Sherman of Citizens for Ethics and Responsibility in Washington about congressional oversight, the confirmation process and the “recess appointments gambit” (as Molly has termed it) floated as a means of circumventing advice and consent for the incoming Trump administration.

Sure to be an instant Thanksgiving classic!

Trump’s Speech or Debate Argument: The Improper Application of a Non-Existent Immunity

In the Supreme Court argument on Donald Trump’s claim of absolute presidential immunity from criminal liability for “official acts,” Trump’s counsel, John Sauer, relied heavily on the Court’s Speech or Debate jurisprudence. See Transcript at 6-8, 31, 34, 36 & 46. Sauer did not go so far as to claim the president was literally entitled to protection under the Speech or Debate Clause, but he contended the issues addressed in the Speech or Debate Clause were “very analogous” to those presented by the criminal prosecution of a (former) president, Tr. at 34, and he argued for the creation of a parallel immunity for the president. Tr. at 36. For the reasons explained below, this argument should be rejected and, even if it were accepted, provides little if any protection for Sauer’s client in this case. Continue reading “Trump’s Speech or Debate Argument: The Improper Application of a Non-Existent Immunity”

How Should the January 6 Committee Respond to Trump’s Lawsuit?

On Friday, November 11, former President Trump filed suit against the January 6 committee to prevent enforcement of the subpoena for documents and testimony the committee issued to him on October 21. The complaint asserts that as a former president Trump is absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony (at least outside the realm of impeachment). In addition, it alleges that the subpoena is invalid for a number of reasons, including that it was not issued for a valid legislative purpose, that it fails the heightened standard of scrutiny established by the Supreme Court for subpoenas of presidential information, and that the January 6 committee lacked authority to issue subpoenas because it was improperly constituted.

All of these claims, in my view, should lose, and I think they all probably would if the litigation ever resulted in a final judgment on the merits. However, as Trump’s lawyers well understand, there is very little chance of that happening before the January 6 committee expires at the end of this Congress, which will most likely moot the case. For Trump’s legal team, the advantage of this lawsuit is that it will buy time and possibly forestall a contempt vote in the House. Continue reading “How Should the January 6 Committee Respond to Trump’s Lawsuit?”

Some Thoughts on the January 6 Committee Subpoena to Former President Trump

As you may have heard, the January 6 select committee has adopted a resolution authorizing its chair to issue a subpoena for documents and testimony under oath to former President Donald Trump. This action raises some legal, political and practical issues, which are considered below.

Is a former president immune from a congressional subpoena? The answer to this question is pretty clearly no. It has been well-established since Watergate that even sitting presidents are subject to judicial subpoena and, as the D.C. Circuit recently observed, its own precedent from that era “strongly implies that [sitting] Presidents enjoy no blanket immunity from congressional subpoenas.” Trump v. Mazars U.S., LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2019), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 140 S.Ct. 2019 (2020). It is therefore very unlikely that former presidents would be found to enjoy such blanket immunity.

Is a former president absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony about his official activities? For reasons I have discussed before, the answer to this question should be no, although I acknowledge there are good reasons why Congress should be (and historically has been) reluctant to compel the appearance of former presidents except in extraordinary circumstances. Continue reading “Some Thoughts on the January 6 Committee Subpoena to Former President Trump”

Who Loves Testimonial Immunity? Just Us.

The Department of Justice, at the invitation of presiding judge Carl Nichols, has filed a statement of its views regarding whether former Trump chief of staff Mark Meadows is entitled to assert testimonial immunity in response to a subpoena from the House select committee investigating the January 6 attack on the Capitol. Because the DOJ brief ultimately concludes that Meadows must provide testimony in this instance, its reasoning may escape serious scrutiny in most quarters. But not on this blog.

So let us count the ways DOJ is full of crap.

  1. DOJ’s fundamental position on testimonial immunity has not changed, and it is still supported by nothing more than ipse dixit.  DOJ reiterates “the Executive Branch’s longstanding position” that “a sitting President’s immediate advisers—current and former—cannot be compelled to testify before Congress about their official duties.” DOJ Br. at 7. As it routinely does, DOJ stresses that its position has been consistent over many years and through administrations of both parties, thus proving self-interestedness is a bipartisan phenomenon and little else.

To support this (longstanding- did I mention that?) position, DOJ offers a cursory regurgitation of arguments/assertions it has made many times before: (1) immunity is needed to protect the president’s independence and autonomy; (2) the president’s advisers should not have to appear because their testimony would largely be protected by executive privilege anyway; and (3) without immunity the president’s advisers would be subject to congressional harassment and distraction from their important duties. DOJ Br. at 5-7.

To be sure, DOJ acknowledges that “some judges” have disagreed with its view, citing in a footnote four opinions, two by judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and two by judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See DOJ Br. at 7 & n. 4. Left unmentioned is the fact that exactly zero judges have agreed with DOJ’s position or even expressed the slightest interest in adopting it.

More importantly, DOJ makes no effort whatsoever to respond to the judicial criticisms of its position, which were first voiced by Judge Bates in 2008 litigation involving Harriet Miers. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F.Supp.2d 53, 100-06 (D.D.C. 2008). Instead, it simply says that it will adhere to its position unless the D.C. Circuit and/or the Supreme Court definitively reject it. DOJ Br. at 7.

This stance is particularly remarkable because another judge called out DOJ for precisely the same obstinacy in 2019:

DOJ . . . assert[s] that Miers was wrongly decided . . . [and] has emphasized that Miers’s sphere of influence is exceedingly limited. The thrust of the latter contention is that Miers is only one opinion . . . and implicitly, that the law is not established by the word of a single district court judge. On the other hand, says DOJ, scores of OLC attorneys have considered this issue over the past five decades, and in a series of opinions, OLC has carefully concluded that senior-level presidential aides do enjoy absolute testimonial immunity. . . . DOJ suggests that, in the absence of a groundswell of judges rejecting the concept, this Court should not readily find that the law is what Miers concluded.

Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F.Supp.3d 148, 203 (D.D.C. 2019). Instead of confronting the analysis in Miers directly or giving the court “any principled reason to interpret the law in a different fashion than Judge Bates did,” the judge noted, DOJ simply dismissed his ruling “before proceeding to draw solely from OLC opinions to support the argument that senior-level presidential aides have absolute testimonial immunity.” Id.

The judge in question, of course, was none other than Ketanji Brown Jackson, who recently became the first (and so far only) Supreme Court appointment of the current occupant of the White House. Given that the McGahn opinion was Jackson’s most important and well-known opinion prior to her Supreme Court nomination, one might have expected DOJ to at least acknowledge her harsh criticism of its testimonial immunity theory. One would be wrong.

Judge Jackson went far beyond merely disagreeing with DOJ on the issue of testimonial immunity. She agreed with Judge Bates that DOJ’s legal position “is all but foreclosed by the binding case law Miers cites,” and she dissected at length “the logical flaws in DOJ’s legal analysis.” McGahn, 415 F.Supp.3d at 202. The judge found that “absolute testimonial immunity for senior-level White House aides seems to be a fiction that has been fastidiously maintained over the course of time through the force of sheer repetition in OLC opinions, and through accommodations that have permitted its proponents to avoid having the proposition tested in the crucible of litigation.” Id. at 214. DOJ’s contention “simply has no basis in law,” its argument “truly makes no sense,” and its position is ultimately based on nothing more than “ipse dixit.” Id. at 206-07, 212 & 214.

In short, Jackson makes clear that she does not view this as a close legal question about which reasonable minds can disagree. Either her McGahn opinion was overwrought and hyperbolic, or DOJ’s testimonial immunity theory is utterly without merit. There is no middle ground.

Maybe someone should ask President Biden which it is. Continue reading “Who Loves Testimonial Immunity? Just Us.”

A Former President’s Authority to Assert Executive Privilege is Incompatible with Executive Branch Doctrine

Last week the Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State held a programentitled “Congress’s Interbranch Role: The Executive, the Court, and Dobbs.” The first panel focused on conflicts between Congress and the executive, particularly disputes over congressional access to information and executive privilege. The panel, consisting of three DOJ/OLC veterans (Professor Josh Chafetz, who was supposed to represent the congressional perspective on these issues, was unfortunately unable to make it), provided an excellent if somewhat executive-tilting overview of the issues in such disputes.

What struck me in listening was the divergence between the principles underlying standard executive branch doctrine on congressional oversight and the theory that a former president may assert executive privilege. Because the panel did not discuss executive privilege as it relates to former presidents, it is worth expounding on that divergence here.

As explained by Will Levi, who was chief of staff to Attorney General Barr in the Trump administration, the executive branch views executive privilege as consisting of four components: (1) presidential communications- communications between the president and senior staff, as well as communications between senior staff and subordinate officials (or even private citizens!) for purposes of formulating advice to the president; (2) deliberative process- predecisional communications in the departments and agencies or other lower levels of the executive branch; (3) law enforcement information (which often arises in the context of attempts to obtain access to investigative or open case files); and (4) state secrets- information related to national security and foreign policy. Levi noted that the presidential communications and deliberative process privileges were qualified privileges that could be overcome by a sufficient congressional showing of need, but he maintained that the law enforcement and state secrets privileges were “more absolute.”

Continue reading “A Former President’s Authority to Assert Executive Privilege is Incompatible with Executive Branch Doctrine”

Checking the Office of Legal Counsel

As discussed in this Lawfare article by William Ford of Protect Democracy, the House Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress has asked GAO to study the feasibility of establishing a Congressional Office of Legal Counsel (COLC) to act as a congressional analogue to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice. The idea would be that COLC could issue opinions on controversial separation-of-powers subjects reflecting the views and perspectives of the legislative branch and thereby function as a counterweight to OLC’s invariably pro-executive positions.

The Lawfare article thoughtfully describes the pros and cons of establishing a COLC. I am skeptical of the idea myself, but I look forward to GAO’s analysis of the issue. In the meantime, there are steps that can be taken to level the playing field between Congress and the executive branch in terms of constitutional analysis.

For example, in recent testimony for the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, I proposed one small step. The House Counsel’s website could be significantly upgraded to provide more information about its legal functions, including “non-privileged information about its legal advice and representation, including court filings, legal opinions and select explanatory or historical documents that would shed light on its operations and the legal views of the House.” This would provide some modest counterbalance to OLC, which maintains an extensive (though selective) database of its opinions on its website.

Another check on OLC would be to obtain more transparency with respect to some of its most controversial opinions. For example, I have a FOIA request to OLC which seeks information about the January 19, 2020 opinion that it submitted in the first Trump impeachment trial. Specifically, I want to find out if the legal advice that it claimed to have given the administration in October 2019 was before or after the October 8, 2019 letter in which White House Counsel Pat Cipollone told the House it would not comply with any subpoenas relating to its investigation of the former president’s efforts to withhold military aid from Ukraine. So far I have not gotten much (a shocker, I know), but still I persist.

There are many other ideas for reining in executive constitutional overreach. In his recent book The Living Presidency, Professor Sai Prakash has suggestions ranging from defunding the White House Counsel and OLC (p. 255) to having Congress issue its own declarations on controverted constitutional issues (p. 265). Similarly, Professor Emily Berman, in Weaponizing the Office of Legal Counsel proposes a number of reforms, including requiring OLC to include “dissenting opinions” as part of the opinion-writing process and increasing the use of details to Congress to give executive branch lawyers from OLC and elsewhere a better sense of the congressional perspective on disputed constitutional matters.

Thus, there is no shortage of ideas for leveling the legal playing field between Congress and the executive branch. Getting Congress to pay attention to these issues when they are not in the headlines is, however, another matter.

Two Lees, One Jackson, and Some Stonewalling

During the confirmation hearings for Judge (soon to be Justice) Ketanji Brown Jackson, she answered written questions for the record from a number of senators, including Senator Mike Lee. One of Senator Lee’s questions (hat tip: Ira Goldman) struck me as odd:

In Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, you took an extremely broad view of standing that all but ignored the previous elements of standing that you clung to in Federal Forest Resource Coalition (individualized injury). Setting aside the merits of the underlying controversy, your opinion never once mentions the phrase “political question.” Isn’t a case where the legislative branch is suing the executive branch a quintessential political question?

One problem with this question is that it was based on a false premise—as she pointed out in her answer, Jackson’s opinion in McGahn did in fact (more than once) use the phrase “political question” and it did so in the context of explaining why the political question doctrine was inapplicable to the case before her.  See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp.3d 148, 178 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically confirmed that not all legal claims that impact the political branches are properly deemed non-justiciable political questions.”).

To be sure, Jackson’s discussion of this issue was somewhat in passing. Her primary point was that the Justice Department’s legal arguments on standing and separation of powers sounded like attempts to evoke the political question doctrine without grappling with well-established limits on that doctrine. See id. at 177-78. But because the Justice Department (representing McGahn) did not actually assert that the political question doctrine applied, the judge presumably thought it unnecessary to discuss the doctrine in depth. Perhaps Lee should ask the Justice Department why it did not think McGahn presented a “quintessential political question.”

I think I can save him the trouble, though. There was a time when legal scholars (to the extent they thought about the issue) very likely would have agreed with the sentiment expressed in Lee’s question. As one noted constitutional expert wrote long ago: “In 1958, when the reach of the political question doctrine was far broader than it is today, no lesser an authority than Judge Learned Hand expressed the view that such a dispute [over a congressional subpoena] between two branches of government was a clear example of a nonjusticiable constitutional question.” Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 231, 266 (1978). For the last 60 years, though, the law has rejected such a broad view of political questions. Continue reading “Two Lees, One Jackson, and Some Stonewalling”

More on Bannon and OLC

In connection with my last post, I want to elaborate on Steve Bannon’s advice of counsel defense. The essence of this defense is that legal advice from his counsel that he was not obligated to comply with the select committee’s subpoena negated the “willfulness” required to violate the contempt of Congress statute (2 U.S.C. §192). Leaving aside the question whether this is a valid legal defense (spoiler alert: it is not), Bannon claims that this defense is bolstered by Office of Legal Counsel opinions which he interprets to excuse him from compliance with the select committee’s subpoena. For example, in his discovery motion, Bannon states “[Bannon’s lawyer] consistently advised the Government that Mr. Bannon was acting in accordance with legal opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, which analyzed the issues under analogous circumstances.”

The significance of the OLC opinions to the purported defense is unclear. One possibility is that Bannon was directly relying on the OLC opinions themselves, rather than simply on his lawyer’s interpretation of them. Another possibility is that the OLC opinions are cited to bolster the reasonableness of the legal advice the lawyer (Robert Costello) provided his client.

Bannon may also be trying to advance something of a slippery slope argument. If he cannot rely directly or indirectly on OLC opinions, then what of executive officials who receive an OLC opinion that specifically advises they need not comply with a congressional subpoena? This is the scenario that Judge Nichols was apparently concerned about when he posed a hypothetical in which Ron Klain refuses to testify based on OLC advice that he has absolute immunity from compelled congressional testimony. In this situation, Nichols asked, could DOJ advise Klain he is immune and then turn around and prosecute him for defying the congressional subpoena?

Continue reading “More on Bannon and OLC”