Category: Congressional Investigations

            Because the analysis of congressional standing in the Miers case depends heavily on an understanding of the history of legislative privilege, attention must be paid to the case of Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928).  Reed involved a select Senate committee formed in the spring of 1926 to investigate alleged fraudulent and unlawful election practices.  After the November 1926 senatorial election in Pennsylvania was contested, the Senate authorized the select committee to take custody of the ballot boxes and to investigate allegations of fraud, illegal expenditures and other irregularities relating to that election.  However, when the Congress adjourned sine die on March 4, 1927, the select committee had not yet taken possession of the ballot boxes and the Senate had not voted on a resolution to continue the select committee’s existence after adjournment.

           

            Subsequently, the select committee demanded that county officials in Delaware County, Pennsylvania deliver to it all ballot boxes and certain other election records.  The county officials responded that they were under legal obligation to maintain custody of the records in question, and could not deliver them to the select committee in the absence of a court order establishing the select committee’s right to the records.  The select committee sought the assistance of the Senate sergeant at arms, who declined to intervene because of questions about the select committee’s authority following adjournment. The select committee then petitioned the federal court for an injunction directing the county officials to turn over the records.  To my knowledge, this was the first time that a congressional committee directly sought the assistance of a court.

 

The District Court Decision

The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It acknowledged the “broad doctrine of the right of the government as parens patriae in promoting the interest of the public, to have the assistance of its courts by injunctive remedy to promote the public interest and prevent injury to public welfare is sustained by ample authority cited by [the select committee]. Reed v. County Commissioners, 21 F.2d 144, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1927). Nevertheless, the court viewed the case before it as different because the select committee’s authority to act after the Senate’s adjournment was at issue. If the question of the select committee’s authority to direct the sergeant at arms had arisen while the Senate was still in session, the court noted, “the question of their authority to act and to have the sergeant at arms comply with their orders, would be determined by the Senate itself.” The court concluded that it lacked the power to make that determination in the Senate’s stead as “the determination of that question is, under the Constitution, conferred upon the Senate alone” and was therefore a legislative, not a judicial, question.

The court had some difficulty in reconciling its conclusion with the established principle, which had been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court earlier that year in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), that individuals imprisoned for contempt of Congress were entitled to judicial review through habeas proceedings. This precedent established, as the court recognized, that controversies regarding the exercise of congressional investigatory power are judicially cognizable. However, as the court noted, such cases were distinguishable on the grounds that the process came from the Senate as a whole, not a committee acting on its own. In these cases, any questions regarding the proper interpretation or application of Senate rules would have been resolved by the Senate itself in the course of holding the individual in contempt.

The court, however, seemed not to be entirely satisfied with this distinction. To bolster its conclusion, it pointed to the fact that a writ of habeas corpus is a right guaranteed by the Constitution and that therefore it is a proper judicial function to resolve habeas cases in which there are “questions of life, liberty, or property between the individual and one depriving him of those rights.” This language could be read to suggest that the nature of the action (i.e., a claim for habeas relief by an individual rather than a claim for injunctive relief by a congressional committee), rather than the question presented (the interpretation of ambiguous congressional rules), determines whether the matter is a judicial or a legislative issue.

To the extent that the court was going in this direction, it was mistaken. The fact that the writ of habeas corpus is mentioned in the Constitution has no bearing on whether the writ authorizes judicial review of congressional contempt proceedings. In Britain the courts consistently found that the right of habeas did not extend to individuals imprisoned by Parliament, and American courts could have taken the same view. Moreover, American courts have allowed actions other than habeas, such as false imprisonment suits, to challenge congressional contempt proceedings.

Ultimately, however, the court did not find that congressional committees were barred in all cases from seeking judicial relief in support of investigations. The court left open the possibility that such an action would be permitted where the committee’s authority to act was clear, noting that “[w]hether or not, if a remedy through the courts be open to them, it would be by proceeding in a court having jurisdiction over the person of the sergeant at arms, has not been considered or suggested by either party.” This interesting observation raises the question of whether the court’s ability to resolve the controversy requires jurisdiction over the congressional official with the power to arrest individuals who refuse congressional orders.

If the judicial power extends to a claim for relief by an individual who has been sanctioned by Congress for refusing to provide information, it must also extend to a congressional action alleging that the individual is subject to sanction for this refusal. The only distinction between the two actions is which party is the plaintiff and which is the defendant. This distinction might be significant if the court lacked the power to provide relief to the congressional plaintiff— but this could not be so once the declaratory judgment became an available remedy. It might also be argued that the sergeant at arms is a necessary party to the action, a possibility hinted at by the passage quoted above.

[My next post will analyze the Supreme Court decision]

From Chris Wallace’s interview of Representative Pete Hoekstra (ranking member of the House intelligence committee, also known as “HPSCI”) yesterday:

WALLACE: On Friday, the Justice Department moved to block congressional investigations of the destruction of these CIA tapes, saying that it would jeopardize its own probe.

Congressman Hoekstra, does that mean your committee is going to stand down?

HOEKSTRA: No, I don’t think so. I think what we’re going to do is we want to hold the community accountable for what’s happened with these tapes. I think we will issue subpoenas.

And once these witness appear in front of the committee, then I think we’ll have to make the decision as to whether we’re going to provide them with immunity or not. But our investigation should move forward.

            At first blush, Hoekstra’s reference to the granting of immunity seems like a non sequitur.  After all, he was asked whether HPSCI would continue its investigation of the tape destruction despite DOJ’s apparent opposition.  What does that have to do with whether HPSCI might take the extraordinary step of granting immunity to witnesses, assuming that one or more of these witnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination? 

The reference to immunity is understandable, however, in the context of Hoekstra’s prior experience in conducting investigations in parallel with ongoing DOJ investigations. In these situations witnesses who are cooperating with DOJ, even those who have already reached a plea agreement or immunity deal, will nonetheless assert a Fifth Amendment privilege vis a vis Congress. This practice stands the purposes of the Fifth Amendment on its head, since the privilege protects individuals from testifying in criminal trials, not in congressional hearings. However, by condoning or encouraging this practice, DOJ can frustrate congressional investigations that it views as nuisances.

An example of how this works is Duke Cunningham, the former congressman now serving time in federal prison for accepting millions of dollars in bribes. Cunningham’s plea agreement required him to cooperate with federal and state law enforcement agents and attorneys, and protected him against potential criminal prosecution for truthful statements made in the course of that cooperation. However, it did not (at least expressly) require cooperation with Congress. The plea agreement also gave DOJ a great deal of leverage over Cunningham because it promised him the possibility of a reduced sentence if his cooperation was satisfactory to the Justice Department.

As a consequence, when HPSCI wanted to interview Cunningham as part of its inquiry (which I led) into his activities as a member of the committee, his lawyer, Lee Blalack, refused to allow Cunningham to cooperate absent permission from the Justice Department. As Blalack more or less acknowledged, his concern was not really that Cunningham would be prosecuted for statements made to HPSCI—instead, he believed that DOJ might retaliate against Cunningham for cooperating with the committee by refusing to seek a reduction in sentence. In effect, this gave DOJ a veto right over Cunningham’s appearance before HPSCI. Thus, when DOJ not only refused to give permission for Cunningham to cooperate but actually asked HPSCI to stop trying to interview him, Blalack informed the committee that Cunningham would not cooperate voluntarily and, if subpoenaed, would assert the Fifth in response to any questions.

What do experiences such as this mean for HPSCI’s investigation into the tape destruction? The chances that HPSCI will actually grant immunity to any witnesses are slim at best. Nor should it do so, at least with respect to witnesses who are cooperating with federal law enforcement. Instead, HPSCI should insist that any agreements, explicit or otherwise, that DOJ reaches with witnesses must also provide for congressional access to these witnesses on the same terms. The Fifth Amendment is supposed to be a shield against compelled self-incrimination in criminal cases, not a sword for the executive branch to use against congressional inquiries.

           Today I attended a DC Bar program entitled “Politics Inside the Department of Justice: Did the Bush Administration Cross the Line?”  The panel consisted of Bud Cummins, (former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas, one of eight US attorneys who were fired), Joseph Rich (formerly of the DOJ Civil Rights Div) and Lee Casey (Baker Hostetler partner who formerly served in the Office of Legal Counsel and Office of Legal Policy in the Reagan Administration).  Charlie Savage, Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Boston Globe and author of the new book “Takeover,” served as moderator. 

            The most interesting insights came from Cummins, who gave a candid and balanced assessment of the US attorney firings.  Cummins said that he does not view the US attorney firings as part of some master plan to politicize the Justice Department (what he described as the “Karl Rove/Dr. Strangelove” theory).  Instead, he believes that the plan was really motivated by the desire of mid-level DOJ officials (like Kyle Sampson) to open up some US Attorney slots that they or their friends could fill.  He is mostly critical of senior DOJ officials for (a) failing to exercise “adult supervision” over their subordinates and (b) for falsely telling Congress that the terminations were based on performance.   

            During the discussion, Savage referred to the May 11, 2006 email sent by Kyle Sampson, telling another DOJ official that “[t]he real problem we have right now with Carol Lam that leads me to conclude that we should have someone ready to be nominated on 11/18, the day her 4-year term expires.”  Although  the email says nothing about what the “real problem” was, Savage argued that the timing suggests that Lam’s firing was related to the search warrant executed on CIA official Dusty Foggo a couple of days later.

             After the panel discussion, I talked with Savage, who seems like a nice young man, and tried to persuade him that this inference is patently ridiculous.  As I explained to him, there is absolutely no evidence that (a) Sampson knew anything about the Foggo search warrant, or (b) anyone at DOJ or the WH cared about, or ever tried to stop, either the Foggo search warrant or the Cunningham investigation more broadly.  Add to this the fact that Lam was on the list of US attorneys to be fired long before there was a Cunningham investigation, and the fact that there are other DOJ emails in the same time frame indicating that the “real problem” with Lam related to her handling of immigration cases and had nothing to do with Cunningham or Foggo.  (I have written a more extensive analysis of this issue, which I will put up on this site once we get the capability).    

             Savage didn’t dispute these facts and said that he wasn’t asserting that Lam had in fact been dismissed for reasons relating to the Foggo/Cunningham investigation, only that there was evidence (“smoke” as he put it) to suggest the possibility.  I suggested that if he really believes this, he should investigate and determine whether there is any substantiation for this theory.  He is an investigative reporter after all.

There is an interesting article from the Politico regarding the enforcement options available to Congress with respect to the refusal of Harriet Miers and other former or current Administration officials to provide information in the investigation of the firing of US attorneys.   The article focuses in particular on the potential for using “inherent contempt,” which it describes as a “really odd” but “technically legal” process.

Inherent contempt is the term used for the procedure by which a legislative body, such as the House or Senate, may arrest, try and imprison a person for contempt.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that the power of each House of Congress to punish contempt, although not explicitly granted by the Constitution, is “essential to the effective exertion of other powers expressly granted, and therefore [] implied.”  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 169 (1927); see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) (first Supreme Court case recognizing the power of the House to punish contempt).  The House and Senate exercised this power on a regular basis until the early 20^th Century, but the House has not used it since 1916 and the Senate has not used it since 1935.

Although inherent contempt may seem archaic, and the idea of Congress putting people in prison may be unsettling, there is no serious question that the power exists and could be lawfully exercised under the proper circumstances.  It is, however, remarkable that this long-dormant power has enjoyed such a resurgent popularity in recent months.  Not only are many bloggers at sites such as TPM Muckraker evidently eager to see this power used to lock up various Bush Administration officials, but even House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers asserted, in a July 19, 2007 letter to WH Counsel Fred Fielding, that inherent contempt might be used against WH Chief of Staff Josh Bolten.  To appreciate how unusual this is, consider that during the Clinton Administration, Republican Committee Chairman (Dan Burton, eg) wrote hundreds of letters complaining about failure to provide information or respond to subpoenas, but to my knowledge not one made reference to the possibility of inherent contempt.  Indeed, inherent contempt has never been used, or even attempted to be used, as a means of resolving an executive-legislative dispute.

The emerging fan base of inherent contempt may wish to consider a few things before they become too enamored of the idea.  Inherent contempt can be used not only against contumacious witnesses, but against anyone who violates the dignity of legislative proceedings (eg, demonstrators who disrupt committee hearings).  Moreover, it can be used not only by Congress, but by state legislatures as well.  While I agree that inherent contempt is a lawful power which can and should be used under appropriate circumstances, it is important to recognize that it is not only cumbersome (as explained below), but is potentially subject to abuse.

For more information on the inherent contempt process, continue below.

INHERENT CONTEMPT POWER

1.Legal Basis. It has long been recognized that the power of each House of Congress to punish contempt, although not explicitly granted by the Constitution, is “essential to the effective exertion of other powers expressly granted, and therefore [] implied.”McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 169 (1927); see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) (first Supreme Court case recognizing the power of the House to punish contempt).The power derives from the Constitution itself; thus, “Congress could not divest itself, or either of its Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for contempt, in cases to which the power of either House properly extended.”In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897).The power extends to punishment of witnesses who refuse to testify on matters pertinent to a valid legislative inquiry because “the power of inquiry– along with process to enforce it– is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174.More recently, in discussing the power of a state legislature to punish contempt, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he past decisions of this Court expressly recognizing the power of the Houses of the Congress to punish contemptuous conduct leave little question that the Constitution imposes no general barriers to the legislative exercise of such power.”Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 499 (1972).

2.Historical Usage.From the late 18^th Century to the early 20^th Century, both the House and Senate exercised the inherent contempt power on numerous occasions.A November 22, 1977 memorandum of the Congressional Research Service summarizes approximately three dozen cases in which the House or Senate imprisoned contumacious persons.In addition to punishing recalcitrant witnesses, the contempt power was used for punishing such interferences with the legislative processes as assault and bribery.It appears that the last use of the inherent contempt power by the House occurred in 1916, when the House imprisoned a United States Attorney for writing an allegedly defamatory letter about a committee.This use of the contempt power was held to be invalid in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), on the ground that it exceeded what was necessary for the preservation of the legislative power.The last use of the inherent contempt power by the Senate occurred in 1935.See Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).

3.Committee Action.The inherent contempt process typically begins with a committee issuing a report to the House finding that a witness has failed to comply with a subpoena or to answer pertinent questions at a hearing.The report recommends that the House adopt a resolution such as that set forth in paragraph 4 below.

4.House Resolution #1.The House then considers and adopts the resolution recommended by the committee.An example of such as resolution follows:

 

WHEREAS, it appears from the report of the _______ Committee that a witness, ___________, called before the Committee making inquiry as directed by House Res. _ (or by House Rule _), declined to answer certain questions (or failed to comply with a subpoena) relevant and pertinent to the matter then under inquiry:

RESOLVED, That the Speaker issue his warrant directed to the Sergeant at Arms, or his deputy, to take in custody wherever to be found the body of ______ and the same in custody to keep, and that the said _________ be forthwith brought to the bar of the House of Representatives, then and there or elsewhere, as it may direct, to answer questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry or show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, and in the meantime to keep the said _____ in his custody to await the further order of the House; and the Speaker shall designate a room to be used for such purpose;

RESOLVED further, That upon his arrest, _________ be furnished with a copy of this resolution and a copy of the report of the Committee;

RESOLVED further, That when the said _______ shall be brought before the bar of the House to answer the charge of contempt of the House of Representatives, as set forth above, the Speaker shall then cause to be read to said ________ the findings by the Committee; the Speaker shall then inquire of said _________ if he desires to be heard, and to have counsel on the charge of being in contempt of the House of Representatives.If the said ________ desires to avail himself of either of these privileges, the same shall be granted to him.If not, the House shall thereupon proceed to take order in the same manner.

 

5.Arrest.The Speaker then issues the warrant to the Sergeant at Arms, who proceeds to arrest the witness.The arrest may be effected by the Deputy Sergeant at Arms if the resolution so permits.See McGrain, 279 U.S. at 155-56.It is less clear, however, whether the power of arrest could be delegated to the Capitol Police.See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. 212a (defining arrest power of Capitol Police and providing that they shall act under the direction of the Capitol Police Board).The witness is then brought before the bar of the House, and the Sergeant at Arms announces that he has taken the witness into custody in accordance with the resolution.

6.Hearing.The hearing is generally conducted immediately after the arrest of the witness.The hearing is normally conducted before the bar of the House, but on some occasions the House has provided that the hearing be conducted before a committee.The charges are read to the witness, and he is provided an opportunity to be heard.He may have counsel to represent him.

7.Resolution # 2.If the House finds that the witness is in contempt, it adopts a resolution such as the following:

RESOLVED, That _______, having been heard pursuant to the citation heretofore issued directing him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for failing to answer the questions of the Committee (or failing to comply with the subpoena issued by the Committee) after subpoena issued, and having failed to show sufficient cause why he should not be punished, ______ is adjudged to be in contempt of the House.

 

8.Resolution # 3.The House issues a resolution imposing imprisonment until such time that the witness purges himself of contempt.At times such imprisonment has been in the Capitol itself; on some occasions the House has ordered that the witness be imprisoned in the District of Columbiajail.An example of the resolution would be:

RESOLVED, That the Sergeant at Arms be directed to hold said ______ in close custody until he shall purge himself of said contempt, or until discharged by order of the House.

9.Duration of Imprisonment.The imprisonment of a contumacious witness may not exceed the termination of the legislative body.See Anderson, 19 U.S. at 231.Arguably, the witness must be released upon adjournment sine die or even a periodic adjournment.

10.Judicial Review.A witness who has been arrested or imprisoned by the House may challenge the House’s action through a petition for habeas corpus or through an action for false imprisonment against the Sergeant at Arms.