The Recess Appointments Clause, Original Vacancies and Attorney General Wirt

As discussed in my prior post on this subject, it seems to have been the prevailing view in the 1814 Senate that the President could not use the Recess Appointments Clause to fill a newly created statutory office, absent explicit authority in the law to do so. This view could rest on three different grounds. First, it might be argued that a newly created office isn’t “vacant” because the term “vacancy” implies that the office has previously been filled. Second, if a newly created office is considered vacant, the vacancy may be said to happen when the statute creating the office becomes law, which will normally be when Congress is in session. Finally, it may thought that any vacancy in an newly created office doesn’t “happen” at all because it is not caused by accidental circumstances like death or resignation.

Many years before the 1814 debate, Alexander Hamilton stated that the RAC was inapplicable to newly created offices on both the first and third grounds. In 1796, Hamilton advised President Washington that the RAC could not be used to create and fill a new diplomatic position during the recess of the Senate. See David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 154 n. 168 (1997). In a 1799 letter to the Secretary of War, Hamilton reiterated his view that “Vacancy is a relative term, and presupposes that the Office has been once filled.” Id. He also argued that “the phrase ‘which may have happened’ serves to confirm this construction” because “it implies casualty- and denotes such Offices as having been once filled, have become vacant by accidental circumstances.” See Michael Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause 31-32 (2005).

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Inappropriate Behavior?

House Rule XI (g)(5) provides

(5) To the maximum extent practicable, each committee shall— 
(A) provide audio and video coverage of each hearing or meeting for the transaction of business in a manner that allows the public to easily listen to and view the proceedings; and 
(B) maintain the recordings of such coverage in a manner that is easily accessible to the public.

Daniel Schuman of the Sunlight Foundation points out, however, that the Legislative Branch Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations holds most of its hearings in a small hearing room in the Capitol (HT-2) that does not have a pre-positioned camera and apparently these proceedings have not typically been broadcast or recorded. Thus, for example, the public will not be able to view tomorrow’s hearing on the Library of Congress, the GAO, the Public Printer and the CBO.

As Schuman notes, it would be very “practicable” for the Appropriations Committee either to move the hearing to one of several available hearing rooms that have a camera or to request that the House Recording Studio provide one in HT-2. While admittedly tomorrow’s hearing is not exactly the half-time show at the Superbowl, the House Rules admit of no exception, even for “really boring” agencies.

The Recess Appointments Clause and the War of 1812

To continue our discussion of the Recess Appointments Clause, I would like to revisit a debate that took place on the Senate floor in March 1814. It concerned actions taken by President Madison earlier that year, while the Senate was in recess. Having received an offer from Czar Alexander of Russia to help mediate an end to the War of 1812, Madison used his powers under the RAC to name three envoys (John Quincy Adams, Albert Gallatin and James Bayard) to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United States.

When Congress returned, Senator Gore of Massachusetts introduced a resolution that declared Madison’s actions to be unconstitutional. The resolution began:

The President of the United States having by the Constitution power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.

RESOLVED, That, in the opinion of the Senate, no such vacancy can happen in any office not before full.

Gore’s argument focused on the words “which may happen” in the RAC. He acknowledged that a newly created office might be said to be “vacant” and that “[a] vacancy may be said to exist in such office, immediately after its creation.” However, “for a vacancy to happen at any time in an office, that office must have been full at some time previous to the period when it did happen; for a vacancy to happen during the recess of the Senate, the office must have been full during their session prior to, and at the commencement of their recess.” (emphasis added). Since the envoy positions given to Adams, Gallatin and Bayard had never been filled previously, no vacancy could have “happened” in these offices, and thus the RAC was not triggered.

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So About that Recess Appointments Clause

Article II, §2, cl. 3 of the Constitution (the “Recess Appointments Clause” or “RAC”) provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their next Session.”

The Constitution requires that Congress “assemble” at least once a year. Under the 20th Amendment, Congress assembles on January 3, unless a different day is established by law. This begins a “session” of Congress, which lasts until it adjourns sine die or until the session expires automatically by the commencement of a new session in the next year. Normally Congress holds one session per year; thus, one would typically refer to a bill or report as having occurred in either the First or Second Session of a particular Congress (eg, 110th Congress, 2d Sess.). However, nothing prohibits holding more than one session per year, and on occasion there have been Congresses that have held more than two sessions (indeed, the first Congress held three sessions).

According to the January 3, 2012 Congressional Daily Digest: “The Senate met in pro forma session to convene the second session of the 112th Congress at 12:01:32 p.m., and adjourned at 12:02:13 p.m. until 11 a.m., on Friday, January 6, 2012.” So after “assembling” for nearly a full second [Update: as an observant reader points out, that should be nearly a full minute- 41 seconds in fact], the Senate adjourned for 2 days, 22 hours, 59 minutes, and 57.87 seconds. (Hope you are taking notes- this could be on the exam).

On January 4, President Obama made four appointments pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause. Three of them were to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and one was the director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).

Depending on whom you ask, these actions were clearly constitutional, clearly unconstitutional, or somewhere in between. Most commentators have focused on the question of whether the Senate was in “recess” at the time the appointments were made. Sometimes this question gets confused with whether the Senate was “adjourned” or “in session,” but these questions are more easily answered. The Senate was certainly adjourned on January 4 (then, again, the Senate is adjourned for at least part of virtually every day). Whether the Senate was “in session” depends on whether one is using this phrase as simply the converse of being adjourned (as it often colloquially used) or whether one is asking if January 4 was “during the Session of Congress” (the phrase used in Article I, section 5, cl. 4). If one means the former, the answer is no; if the latter, the answer is yes because the second session of the 112th Congress convened on January 3.

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Did Senator Paul’s TSA Detention Violate the Arrest Clause?

Senator Rand Paul was “detained” earlier today by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) after the Senator refused to consent to a full body pat down at the airport in Nashville, Tennessee. Senator Paul was at the airport to catch a flight to Washington, DC.

This raises an interesting question under the Arrest Clause, art. I, § 6, cl. 1, which provides that Senators and Representatives “shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.“

For these purposes, I believe that the Senate has been in session since January 3 (notwithstanding some debate about its status for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause) and, in any event, the Senate apparently is holding votes this afternoon (so Senator Paul alternatively would be “going to” the Senate’s session). However, as we have discussed before (see here and here), the exceptions to the privilege against arrest have been construed so broadly as to leave it with no application to ordinary criminal arrest. Since the practice of arresting people in civil cases no longer exists, this leaves the privilege with little practical import.

In this case, however, it does not appear that TSA was purporting to detain Senator Paul for any criminal violation.  Indeed, it is not clear that TSA had any authority to detain him at all (which is perhaps why TSA is denying that he was detained). I don’t think that the Arrest Clause requires TSA to allow Members of Congress to board airplanes without complying with security regulations. But if TSA agents otherwise sought to prevent Senator Paul from leaving the airport or otherwise to detain him, that may be a different matter.

Bolling Memorandum on Breaking Ties in the Virginia Senate

Virginia Lieutenant Governor Bolling has issued this ruling on his power to break deadlocks in the Virginia Senate. In brief, Bolling concludes that his power to vote includes organizational matters such as determining rules of procedure and voting on officers. However, he also finds that he lacks the power to vote on final passage of certain matters, such as appropriations bills, tax bills and state constitutional amendments, for which the Virginia Constitution requires the vote of a “majority of the members elected to each house.” The Lieutenant Governor, Bolling reasons, is not an elected member of the Senate and therefore cannot break ties on a final vote on such matters.

More on Gingrich and Judges

Former Speaker Gingrich’s plan to rein in the federal judiciary has met with near-universal criticism, but Curt Levey has gamely offered a qualified defense in the Wall Street Journal. Levey contends that the attacks on Gingrich’s proposal are “overblown.” As an example, he has this to say about Gingrich’s idea of subpoenaing federal judges to testify before Congress:

Congress routinely asks executive officials outside the White House to testify about their decisions. It occasionally subpoenas them to compel attendance, and arrest would be a last resort.  It’s unclear why applying the same rules to the judicial branch threatens the separation of powers, especially if done in the context of considering judicial reform proposals like Mr. Gingrich’s.  Subpoenaing Justices of the Supreme Court, the only court created by the Constitution, is a possible exception.

So let’s take a closer look at this aspect of Gingrich’s plan and see whether it is in fact as radical as critics have suggested.

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Using Inherent Contempt Against Federal Judges

In my prior post on former Speaker Gingrich’s plan to subpoena federal judges to testify before Congress, I assumed that any enforcement of such subpoenas would follow the statutory contempt process set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 194. It crossed my mind to mention an alternative mechanism, but the idea seemed so unlikely (zany, one might even say) that I did not do so.

The aforementioned alternative involves what is known as “inherent contempt,” under which one house of Congress orders its Sergeant at Arms to take a recalcitrant witness into custody and to bring the witness before the bar of the House or Senate to be tried for contempt. This power was exercised on a regular basis until the early 20th Century, but the House has not used it since 1916 and the Senate has not used it since 1935. For more on how inherent contempt works, see here.

This weekend Gingrich suggested in an interview that Congress could use this power to secure the attendance of judges at congressional hearings. This is a surprising suggestion for several reasons. First, the recognized method for challenging inherent contempt is to seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. I imagine that it wouldn’t take the subpoenaed judge very long to procure a writ directing his or her release from congressional custody.

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Billy Martin’s Contract Extended

According to the Hill: “Martin was hired in July. 

Since then he has ‘interviewed numerous witnesses, and conducted extensive legal research regarding the nature of due process rights which attach to Members of Congress appearing before this committee,’ according to the committee.”

But not read Point of Order, apparently. Sigh.